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I. INTRODUCTION
History will pass judgment on all key participants in the 2000
presidential litigation, but none will receive greater scrutiny than the
justices of the Florida and United States Supreme Courts. Both institutions
and all sixteen justices already have been subject to criticism from

* Barry Richard is an attorney with the law firm of Greenberg Traurig in Tallahassee,
Florida. He was a member of the Bush/Cheney legal team in the election litigation in Florida. For
a detailed account of Mr. Richard's involvement in the election litigation, see Barry Richard,
LitigatingHistory, 28 No. I Litigation 8 (Fall 2001).
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scholars, lawyers and politicians on opposing sides of the political and
ideological spectrum.
Continued public confidence in the two institutions and in our entire
judicial system requires a broader and more widely disseminated defense.
Because justices are naturally and properly reluctant to defend their
decisions outside the scope of the opinions themselves, the defense falls
to the lawyers who argued before them. The task is not difficult. A careful
analysis of the courts' decisions and the legal strategies that brought the
cases before them will illustrate that neither court was motivated by
political partisanship.

II.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

A. The Case As It Reached the Court
Florida's statutory scheme for challenging election results is not wellsuited to the peculiarities of choosing presidential electors. Enacted in bits
and pieces over a period of 154 years, it is anything but a model of clarity.
It is unlikely that the drafters ever contemplated its application to the
selection of presidential electors, and there is no previously recorded
interpretation of the provisions as applied to a statewide contest. As
presented to the Florida Supreme Court in November 2000, it was a case
of first impression.
There are two ways to challenge election results under Florida law.
Prior to the results being certified by a county canvassing board, a
candidate or person qualified to vote in the election can file a protest and
request that one or more counties conduct a manual recount.' After the
vote has been certified, an election contest can be filed in the trial court.'
The final machine tally had given Bush a 327 vote lead in Florida, and
Gore chose to file a protest and request manual recounts in four counties
in the hopes of making up the difference. The chosen counties shared two
factors. They each had a relatively high vote total, and the machine total
had given Gore a substantial margin of victory in each of them. By
November 13th, the Gore game plan was in trouble. With the manual
recounts only partially completed, and many heavily Democratic precincts
not yet counted, the Bush lead had actually grown to 388 votes, and Gore
was facing a looming deadline.
Two separate, and apparently conflicting, statutes dealt with the date
of submission of returns by the county canvassing boards to the

I. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2000).
FLA. STAT. § 102.168(1) (2000).

2.
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Department of State Both statutes required that the returns be received
by 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day after the election, in this case November
14th. Section 102.111 provided that, as of the deadline, "all missing
counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall
be certified."4 Section 102.112, on the other hand, provided that "such
returns may be ignored and the results on file at that time may be certified
by the department." 5 The Secretary of State exercised her discretion to
deny additional time for manual recounts. This was the position of the case
when it reached the Florida Supreme Court on the first of two appeals.
No Federal constitutional issues were raised in the Bush brief, a fact
reiterated at oral argument and noted in the Court's opinion.6 The Bush
team was unwilling to place all of its legal eggs in the state basket. The
team had filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida seeking to enjoin manual recounts on equal
protection and due process grounds. The district court dismissed the case
and Bush appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which agreed to hear the case
en banc on an expedited basis.
The federal appeal was pending at the time of the Florida Supreme
Court appeal, and there was concern that if the Florida Supreme Court
passed on the constitutional issues, the Federal court would lose
jurisdiction to address them. Under the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine, a lower
federal court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of a state high court,
even on a federal constitutional issue.7 The only available review is
directly to the United States Supreme Court, and the Bush team had no
reason to assume that the U.S. Supreme Court would grant certiorari.
Thus, the case that reached the Florida Supreme Court in November was
one of statutory construction and nothing more.
B. The FirstDecision
The Florida Supreme Court resolved the apparent conflict between the
"shall" and "may" language applying traditional rules of statutory
construction.8 The court reasoned that the permissive statute took
preference because it was contained in the more specific and later enacted
provision, and because the permissive language operated more logically

3. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.111(1), .112(1) (2000).

4.

FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2000).
5. FLA. STAT. § 102.112(1) (2000).

6. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 n.10 (Fla. 2000),
vacated by Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
7. D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923).
8. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1233-36.
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in par material with other connected election provisions.' Having
determined, as had the trial court, that the Secretary of State possessed the
discretion to accept manual recount returns after the statutory deadline
date, the court addressed the circumstances under which she could exercise
that discretion to reject such returns.' °
The court began its analysis with the "guiding principle" that "the will
of the people, not a hyper-technical reliance upon statutory provisions,
should be our guiding principle in election cases."" Upon that foundation,
the court set forth the rule that would dictate the result: the Secretary of
State's authority to ignore late-filed returns was a drastic measure that
could be exercised only when inclusion of the returns would compromise
the integrity of the electoral process, either by precluding a candidate from
filing a judicial contest of an election under Section 102.168, or by
"precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral
process."' 2 The court extended the deadline for counties to file their
returns until November 26, 2000.'3
C. Three CriticalRulings Against Gore
One day after the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion, the MiamiDade County Canvassing Board, which had completed one percent of its
manual recount, voted to stop counting. The decision was perceived at the
time as a major setback for the Gore effort. The pace that Gore was
picking up votes in the other three counties was insufficient to close the
gap with Bush, and it was considered essential that he have access to the
ten thousand undervote ballots that had been rejected in the Miami-Dade
machine recount.
When lower courts refused to order the canvassing board to resume
counting, Gore again sought help from the Florida Supreme Court. In a
decision overlooked by those who accuse the court of being politically
motivated, a unanimous Florida Supreme Court denied the Gore petition
on November 23, 2000.'" At that time, pressure was beginning to build on
Gore to discontinue his legal battle. The denial of the petition to order
resumption of the Miami-Dade recount might well have been the final
blow to the Gore campaign, a,fact surely not lost on the Florida justices.
When the Secretary of State finally certified the results on November
26th, Bush was declared the winner of Florida's 25 electoral votes by a.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1240.
Gore v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd., 780 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2000).
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537-vote margin. Gore immediately filed his election contest under
Section 102.168, and the case proceeded to trial before Circuit Judge N.
Sanders Sauls.' 5 Gore, running perilously short of time for manual
recounts to be completed, urged Judge Sauls to order manual counting of
the disputed ballots to begin immediately. When he refused, the Gore legal
team once again asked the Florida Supreme Court to intervene and order
that the manual recount proceed pending the completion of the trial. In its
petition, the Gore lawyers argued "[t]ime is of the essence in this matter
this contest action must be resolved by December 12th to prevent
'precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral
process."' On December 1st, the Supreme Court, which eleven days earlier
had recognized that December 12th was the deadline to finalize Florida's
selection of electors, and with no knowledge of how long the trial before
denied this latest effort by Gore to
Judge Sauls would take, unanimously
16
jump start the manual recount.
On the same day that the Florida Supreme Court refused to overturn
Judge Sauls' order, the court dealt another setback to Gore. On November
20, 2000, Palm Beach County Judge Jorge LaBarga had dismissed a
number of cases that had challenged the election based upon alleged flaws
in the "butterfly ballot." The plaintiffs had sought a new election or, in the
alternative, a "'statistical reallocation" of the Palm Beach County vote.
Because of the size of Gore's lead in the county, such a reallocation would
have ended the judicial battle in his favor. On December 1, 2000, the
denied the petition, cutting off one more avenue
Florida Supreme Court
17
for a Gore victory.
D. The Second FloridaSupreme Court Decision
After a two-day trial, Judge Sauls ruled for Bush, finding that Gore had
failed to demonstrate that the Canvassing Boards had abused their
discretion and failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that
the results of the election would have been changed because of illegal
votes being received or legal votes being rejected. The Florida Supreme
Court's November 21st opinion had been unanimous. 8 Its second
decision, seventeen days later, was sharply split four to three with strong
dissenting opinions from Chief Justice Wells and Justice Harding. 9 The
majority ruled that the Section 166, which provides for protests before
canvassing boards, Section 168, which provides for contests in the circuit

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Gore v. Harris, slip op., No. 00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000).
Fladell v. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000).
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
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court, were unrelated, and that the circuit court should therefore have held
a de novo proceeding.2" Accordingly, the majority found that Judge Sauls
had erred in deciding whether to order manual recounts by applying an
abuse of discretion standard to the actions of the canvassing boards. 2' The
majority further concluded that Gore had made a sufficient showing to
place the results of the election in doubt, and satisfied the standard stated
in the contest statute. The decision ordered an immediate statewide manual
recount.22
In his dissent, Chief Justice Wells concluded that the two statutory
sections should be interpreted in pari material,that abuse of discretion
was the proper standard, and that the effect of the majority opinion was to
entitle a person filing an election contest to a manual recount simply by
filing a complaint. 3 He also expressed concern over the constitutional
implications of the majority decision, particularly the lack of uniform
standards.24 Justice Harding agreed with the majority that the trial court
proceeding was de novo. He concluded, however, that Gore had failed to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the outcome of the statewide
election would likely be changed when the only evidence they produced
was related to a selected subset of counties most favorable to the
candidate.25 Justice Harding also expressed serious doubts about the
impact of the procedure ordered by the majority on due process and equal
protection rights.26
The dissenting positions articulated by Justices Wells and Harding
reflected the arguments I had vigorously advanced to the Florida Supreme
Court on December 7, 2000, and, not surprisingly, I consider them the
better-reasoned positions. I do not, however, believe that the justices in the
majority were motivated by political partisanship. Such a notion is belied
by the unblemished record and widespread reputation that each of the
justices enjoys as an individual of high integrity, and by the record of their
conduct throughout this process.
Certainly, there was a strong difference in emphasis and ideological
approach among the justices. The majority began with the premise that
ascertaining the true will of every voter was paramount. The court was
consistent in its adherence to that principle, giving it precedence (in effect
if not word) over traditional rules of construction and burden of proof.
Those justices were equally consistent, however, in refusing to boost

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1252.
1262.
1266-67.
1268.
1272.
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Gore's chances of success when doing so would result in disenfranchising
voters. Thus, the court unanimously affirmed the judgments against the
plaintiffs in two cases where Gore supporters sought to invalidate absentee
ballots that favored Bush by over two thousand votes." The effect of such
an invalidation would have been to hand Gore Florida's twenty-five
electoral votes without the necessity for any further recounts and, because
the cases involved no federal issue, without the risk of U.S. Supreme Court
review.
The majority also remained consistent in its statutory construction,
regardless of which candidate benefitted. While the litigation remained in
the protest stage, pursuant to subsection 166, and while the case was
pending before Judge Sauls, the Florida Supreme Court refused to order
manual recounts when such an order would have interfered with the
exercise of discretion by canvassing boards or the circuit court. When the
court refused to order recounts on November 23rd and again on December
1st, it was well aware of the fact that the clock was ticking against Gore.
III.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

A The Decision to Accept Jurisdiction
Some critics of the U.S. Supreme Court's involvement in the
presidential litigation charge that the Court's intervention was
unprecedented and motivated by partisan politics. I believe that both
charges are unjustified.
Historically, the Court has not hesitated to intervene in cases involving
significant issues of equal protection with respect to voting. Elections are
likely the most frequent subject of U.S. Supreme Court equal protection
review and surely one of the most frequent subjects of any review by the
Court. In the twenty years prior to the presidential litigation, the high
Court has granted certiorari to review equal protection claims in thirty
election cases. Those cases are not limited, as some may suggest, to cases
involving allegations of racial discrimination. Almost half did not involve
a racial issue. Most notable were the apportionment cases. 28 The Court has

27. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000); Taylor v. Martin
County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Wesberry v. Sanders; 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186 (1996) (filing fee for delegates to vote at national convention held unconstitutional); Norman
v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (petition requirement for minor party placement on ballot held

constitutional).
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also regularly granted certiorari to resolve issues involving the respective
powers or duties of the other branches.29
Those who argue that the majority departed from precedent also ignore
the fact that this case was truly unique. This was not just another election
case. The country had not faced such a stalemate in the selection of a
president since the Tilden-Hayes election of 1876.30
The Florida Legislature, both houses of which were controlled by
Republicans, had already convened to name a competing electoral
delegation in the event that a recount changed the results. Congress, also
under Republican control, would have had to choose between the
competing delegations and would undoubtedly have chosen the Bush
delegates. 3 ' At that point, the high Court would again have been petitioned
to grant certiorari. Had it declined again, critics undoubtedly would have
charged that the Court failed to get involved because it was motivated by
a desire to see Bush elected, albeit this time by failing to get involved. At
that point, the country would have suffered through an extended period of
uncertainty and Congress would have been drawn into the cauldron. The
wounds would have been deeper and would have taken longer to heal.
The U.S. Supreme Court is the arbiter of last resort in our system. In
an institutional stalemate of this magnitude, I believe it is the
responsibility of the Court to act.

B. The FirstDecision
The U.S. Constitution does not provide for the direct election of
presidential electors. Instead, it simply states that, "Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" its
allocated electors.32 In 1892, the Supreme Court recognized that the
drafters of the Constitution, by express reference to the authority of the
legislaturesof the states to direct the method of selection, had reposed the
power exclusively in the state legislatures, rather than the states
themselves.33 The effect of the provision is that even a state constitution

29. See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999);
Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486
(1969); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
30. The Court was not called upon to intervene in the Tilden-Hayes controversy, which was

resolved by Congress.
31. Under federal law, if both houses of Congress were unable to agree, the decision would
be made by Florida's governor, a Republican and brother of George W. Bush.
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
33. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
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cannot limit or override the legislature's prerogative with respect to the
method of selection.
In its decision on December 4, 2000, the Supreme Court expressed
concern that the Florida Supreme Court's November 21st opinion may
have violated Article II, Section 1 in either of two regards.34 The first
concern arose because the Florida Supreme Court referred to several
provisions of the Florida Constitution in addressing the circumstances
where the Secretary of State could refuse late-filed returns from the
canvassing boards." Because Article II, Section 1gave the states exclusive
jurisdiction over the method of selecting presidential electors, any
construction that disregarded legislative intent because of a state
constitutional provision would violate the U.S. Constitution and be
invalidated.
The second concern was rooted deeply in the history of presidential
selection. In 1876, Samuel Tilden, the Democratic nominee, won the
popular vote over the Republican nominee, Rutherford Hayes by a small
margin. Before the presidency was finally determined four months later,
the nation would witness a convoluted drama that makes the 2000 election
look like a walk in the park.
Tilden was one vote short of a majority in the Electoral College, but
twenty electoral votes in four states were disputed and two sets of results
from each of them was returned. While Tilden needed only one of the
disputed votes, Hayes needed all twenty to win. Congress established a
commission composed of fifteen members, five each from the Senate,
House and Supreme Court. The Commission's determination of disputed
delegates was final unless overturned by both houses of Congress. The
Commission was perfectly balanced, with seven Democrats, seven
Republicans, and an Independent Supreme Court Justice. The balance was
disrupted, however, when the Independent justice was elected to the
Senate by his home state legislature, resigned from the Court, and was
replaced on the Commission by a Republican. As a result, the Commission
awarded each of the disputed delegations to Republican Hayes, and
Congress, with the Senate under Republican control and the House under
Democratic control, was deadlocked, leaving the Commission decision
undisturbed.
In a desperate effort to derail the train, the Democrats objected to a
single Republican elector from the undisputed Wisconsin delegation. The
Republican Senate quickly overruled the objection, but the Democratic
House engaged in a lengthy, unruly debate. Finally, at 3:38 a.m., the

34. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
35. Id.
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House avoided a true constitutional crisis, by concurring with the Senate;
thus electing Hayes president by one electoral vote.
In the aftermath of the Tilden-Hayes experience, Congress enacted the
following:
If any state shall have provided, by laws enactedprior to the
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final
determination of any controversy or contest concerning the
appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such
determination shall have been made at least six days before
the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said
day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting
of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the
Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the
ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is
concerned.36
The provision was forgotten after its enactment until the Bush legal
team discovered it and made it a centerpiece of its first petition for
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The provision itself would not have been an issue in the presidential
litigation because it did not mandate the states to do anything. Referred to
by the U.S. Supreme Court as the "safe harbor" provision,37 it simply
provided that the selection of electoral delegations in accordance with its
provisions would be conclusive and thus not subject to challenge in
Congress.38 As with the Court's first concern, its second concern arose
from a comment in the Florida's Supreme Court's November 21, 2000,
opinion. The Court had stated:
We conclude that, consistent with the Florida election
scheme, the Secretary may reject a Board's amended returns
only if the returns are submitted so late that their inclusion
will preclude a candidate from contesting the certification or
preclude Florida's voters from participatingfully in the
federal electoralprocess.39

36. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
37. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

38. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
39. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239 (Fla. 2000).
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The comment could be read as an acknowledgement of legislative
intent to take advantage of the safe harbor provision. If the Florida
Supreme Court decision extending the deadlines for submission of
canvassing board returns had been a departure from "laws enacted prior
to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors,"4' Florida would have
lost the benefit of the safe harbor, and its electors would have been subject
to challenge in Congress. If the Florida Supreme Court decision had thus
defeated legislative intent, it would have violated the exclusive delegation
of determining the method of elector selection to the state legislatures by
Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
Ifpolitical partisanship motivated the U.S. Supreme Court majority, the

Court's December 4, 2000 opinion's two concerns would have provided
adequate opportunity to end the litigation and ensure the election of Bush.
Instead, the Court exercised commendable judicial restraint and extended

significant deference to the Florida Supreme Court. It remanded the case
to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification of that Court's holding with
respect to the U.S. Supreme Court's two concerns."'
C. The First UnitedStates Supreme Court Decision
The December 12, 2000, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that
ended the litigation was a reasonable, if not necessary, consequence of the
application of legal principles that counsel for both candidates had agreed
to early in the litigation to the facts as they subsequently developed.
In the November 20th oral argument to the Florida Supreme Court,
David Boies, Gore's lead counsel, was questioned regarding the
importance of uniformity in manual recounts:
JUSTICE PARIENTE: Is the uniformity of how these manual
recounts are conducted essential to the integrity of the
process or, also, to the constitutionality of the statute?
BOIES: Your honor, I think it is important to the integrity of
the process. I think if you had very wide variations, you could
raise constitutional problems.42
Considering the stage of the proceeding, Boies's response was not a
concession, and certainly not a mistake ofjudgment. It was a candid and
reasonable acknowledgment of a principle of constitutional law that could
hardly be denied. Moreover, there was no reason for him to assume that

40. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
41. Bush v.Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
42. Fla. Sup. Ct. argument (Nov. 20, 2000), also available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/
docs/election2000/fsc1 120transcript.htmil.
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uniform standards would not be set by the Court. In fact, a short time later
in the argument, he urged the Court to do so:
BOIES: For the reasons that you point out, it is quite
important that this Court be as specific as possible in terms4 of
3
the standard to be applied, so that it will have uniformity.
As it turned out, the Court did not set uniform standards in either of its
opinions. The occurrences immediately following the Florida Supreme
Court's November 21, 2000, decision set the stage for the U.S. Supreme
Court's final decision. On November 22, 2000, the Palm Beach County
Circuit Court denied a Gore-team petition to impose a liberal standard on
the canvassing board that allowed every hanging or dimpled chad on a
ballot to be counted as a vote. Instead, the court allowed the board to
proceed with a more conservative standard by which it considered the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether to count a vote.
On November 23, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court refused to order
Miami-Dade County to resume its manual recount." Now desperate to
increase Gore's chances of picking up votes, Mr. Boies personally
appeared before the Broward County Canvassing Board on November
24th and persuaded it to adopt the more liberal standard that Palm Beach
had refused to adopt. The result of the different standards was dramatic.
Broward County recovered twelve percent of the machine-rej ected ballots,
sixty times that of Palm Beach County's two one-hundredth's of a percent.
It is not surprising under these circumstances that seven members of the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the lack of uniform standards in the
Florida recount procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court split 5-4 as to the remedy; the majority held that the Florida
recount had to end because the deadline for the Florida delegation under
the safe harbor provision, December 12, 2000, had arrived. 45 Here again,
the majority's conclusion rested upon a premise to which both candidates'
counsel agreed. In its brief, the Bush team argued that December 12th was
the deadline for finalization of Florida's electors. Neither the Gore team
nor the Florida Supreme Court ever disputed this proposition.
During the November 20, 2000, Florida Supreme Court argument,
David Boies acknowledged that December 12, 2000, was the deadline:
CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS: If the counsel for the Attorney
General is correct, and December 12 is the date by which
* * * the certification has to be made for the Electoral

43. Id.
44. Gore v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd., 780 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2000).

45. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (2000).
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College, and as I read Section V of the U.S. Code, what that
date means is that all of the controversies and contests in the
state have to be finally determined by that date. *** Do you
agree with that?
BOIES: I do, your honor.46
In its December 11, 2000, clarification opinion after remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
a proper reading of the Florida Legislature's required adherence to that
deadline:
As always, it is necessary to read all provisions of the
election code in pari material. In this case, that
comprehensive reading required that there be time for an
election contest pursuant to section 102.168, which all parties
had agreed was a necessary component of the statutory
deadline setforth in
scheme and to accommodate the outside
47
3 US.C. § 5 of December 12, 2000.
It is indisputable that from the beginning of the litigation, all of the
major players agreed that the Florida Legislature intended to comply with
the federal safe harbor statute, and that December 12, 2000, was therefore
the deadline for all Florida activities relating to selection of its electors to
conclude. Given this universal agreement, it is difficult to understand how
the U.S. Supreme Court can be criticized for ending the litigation on that
very date.
IV. CONCLUSION

The architects of the U.S. Constitution constructed a complex stage on
which the drama of an inconclusive presidential election would be played
out. All three branches at both state and federal levels of government were
given roles. If either court refrained from playing its part, or for any of the
justice modified an opinion out of fear of criticism, it would have been an
abdication of the highest responsibility of the office. In the 2000 litigation,
I believe both supreme courts played their roles in the manner intended by
the architects.

46. Fla. Sup. Ct. argument (Nov. 20, 2000), also available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/
docs/election2000/fscI 120transcript.html.
47. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1290 (Fla. 2000)
(emphasis added).

